picoclaw/pkg/config/config_test.go

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package config
import (
"encoding/json"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
feat(credential): part1 add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard ke… (#1521) * feat(credential): add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard keygen - pkg/credential: new package with AES-256-GCM enc:// credential format, HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (passphrase + optional SSH key binding), ErrPassphraseRequired / ErrDecryptionFailed sentinel errors, and PassphraseProvider hook for runtime passphrase injection - pkg/credential/store: lock-free SecureStore via atomic.Pointer[string]; passphrase never written to disk or os.Environ - pkg/credential/keygen: ed25519 SSH key generation helper used by onboard - pkg/config: replace os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar) with credential.PassphraseProvider() at all three call sites so that LoadConfig and SaveConfig use whatever passphrase source is active - cmd/picoclaw/onboard: prompt for passphrase with echo-off, generate picoclaw-specific SSH key, re-encrypt existing config on re-onboard - docs/credential_encryption.md: design doc for the enc:// format * fix(credential): address Copilot review comments on PR #1521 - credential.go: decouple ErrPassphraseRequired from env var name; message is now 'enc:// passphrase required' since PassphraseProvider may come from any source, not just os.Environ - credential.go: Resolver resolves symlinks via EvalSymlinks before the isWithinDir containment check, preventing symlink-based path traversal for file:// credential references - store.go: tighten comment to describe only what SecureStore guarantees (in-memory only); remove claims about how callers transport the value - store_test.go: replace the meaningless GetReturnsCopy test (Go strings are immutable, equality across two calls proves nothing) with TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet that exercises atomic.Pointer under 10-goroutine concurrent Set/Get load - config_test.go: update error-message assertion to match new sentinel text - docs/credential_encryption.md: remove reference to non-existent 'picoclaw encrypt' subcommand; describe the onboard flow instead * fix(config): encryptPlaintextAPIKeys: struct-based encryption, fail-fast, remove raw []byte * fix(credential): require SSH private key for encryption/decryption, remove passphrase-only mode * lint: fix credential keygen lint, fix test keygen * onboard: make encryption opt-in via --enc flag Encryption (passphrase prompt + SSH key generation) is now only triggered when the user passes --enc to 'picoclaw onboard'. Without the flag, onboard skips the credential-encryption setup and writes a plain config + workspace templates directly. - Add --enc BoolFlag in NewOnboardCommand() - Pass encrypt bool into onboard() - Guard passphrase prompt, SSH key generation, and related env-var setup behind the encrypt branch - Adjust 'Next steps' output so the passphrase reminder only appears when --enc was used
2026-03-16 06:06:32 +00:00
"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/credential"
)
feat(credential): part1 add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard ke… (#1521) * feat(credential): add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard keygen - pkg/credential: new package with AES-256-GCM enc:// credential format, HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (passphrase + optional SSH key binding), ErrPassphraseRequired / ErrDecryptionFailed sentinel errors, and PassphraseProvider hook for runtime passphrase injection - pkg/credential/store: lock-free SecureStore via atomic.Pointer[string]; passphrase never written to disk or os.Environ - pkg/credential/keygen: ed25519 SSH key generation helper used by onboard - pkg/config: replace os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar) with credential.PassphraseProvider() at all three call sites so that LoadConfig and SaveConfig use whatever passphrase source is active - cmd/picoclaw/onboard: prompt for passphrase with echo-off, generate picoclaw-specific SSH key, re-encrypt existing config on re-onboard - docs/credential_encryption.md: design doc for the enc:// format * fix(credential): address Copilot review comments on PR #1521 - credential.go: decouple ErrPassphraseRequired from env var name; message is now 'enc:// passphrase required' since PassphraseProvider may come from any source, not just os.Environ - credential.go: Resolver resolves symlinks via EvalSymlinks before the isWithinDir containment check, preventing symlink-based path traversal for file:// credential references - store.go: tighten comment to describe only what SecureStore guarantees (in-memory only); remove claims about how callers transport the value - store_test.go: replace the meaningless GetReturnsCopy test (Go strings are immutable, equality across two calls proves nothing) with TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet that exercises atomic.Pointer under 10-goroutine concurrent Set/Get load - config_test.go: update error-message assertion to match new sentinel text - docs/credential_encryption.md: remove reference to non-existent 'picoclaw encrypt' subcommand; describe the onboard flow instead * fix(config): encryptPlaintextAPIKeys: struct-based encryption, fail-fast, remove raw []byte * fix(credential): require SSH private key for encryption/decryption, remove passphrase-only mode * lint: fix credential keygen lint, fix test keygen * onboard: make encryption opt-in via --enc flag Encryption (passphrase prompt + SSH key generation) is now only triggered when the user passes --enc to 'picoclaw onboard'. Without the flag, onboard skips the credential-encryption setup and writes a plain config + workspace templates directly. - Add --enc BoolFlag in NewOnboardCommand() - Pass encrypt bool into onboard() - Guard passphrase prompt, SSH key generation, and related env-var setup behind the encrypt branch - Adjust 'Next steps' output so the passphrase reminder only appears when --enc was used
2026-03-16 06:06:32 +00:00
// mustSetupSSHKey generates a temporary Ed25519 SSH key in t.TempDir() and sets
// PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH to its path for the duration of the test. This is required
// whenever a test exercises encryption/decryption via credential.Encrypt or SaveConfig.
func mustSetupSSHKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "picoclaw_ed25519.key")
if err := credential.GenerateSSHKey(keyPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mustSetupSSHKey: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
}
func TestAgentModelConfig_UnmarshalString(t *testing.T) {
var m AgentModelConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(`"gpt-4"`), &m); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal string: %v", err)
}
if m.Primary != "gpt-4" {
t.Errorf("Primary = %q, want 'gpt-4'", m.Primary)
}
if m.Fallbacks != nil {
t.Errorf("Fallbacks = %v, want nil", m.Fallbacks)
}
}
func TestAgentModelConfig_UnmarshalObject(t *testing.T) {
var m AgentModelConfig
data := `{"primary": "claude-opus", "fallbacks": ["gpt-4o-mini", "haiku"]}`
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(data), &m); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal object: %v", err)
}
if m.Primary != "claude-opus" {
t.Errorf("Primary = %q, want 'claude-opus'", m.Primary)
}
if len(m.Fallbacks) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("Fallbacks len = %d, want 2", len(m.Fallbacks))
}
if m.Fallbacks[0] != "gpt-4o-mini" || m.Fallbacks[1] != "haiku" {
t.Errorf("Fallbacks = %v", m.Fallbacks)
}
}
func TestAgentModelConfig_MarshalString(t *testing.T) {
m := AgentModelConfig{Primary: "gpt-4"}
data, err := json.Marshal(m)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
}
if string(data) != `"gpt-4"` {
t.Errorf("marshal = %s, want '\"gpt-4\"'", string(data))
}
}
func TestAgentModelConfig_MarshalObject(t *testing.T) {
m := AgentModelConfig{Primary: "claude-opus", Fallbacks: []string{"haiku"}}
data, err := json.Marshal(m)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
}
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var result map[string]any
json.Unmarshal(data, &result)
if result["primary"] != "claude-opus" {
t.Errorf("primary = %v", result["primary"])
}
}
func TestAgentConfig_FullParse(t *testing.T) {
jsonData := `{
"agents": {
"defaults": {
"workspace": "~/.picoclaw/workspace",
"model": "glm-4.7",
"max_tokens": 8192,
"max_tool_iterations": 20
},
"list": [
{
"id": "sales",
"default": true,
"name": "Sales Bot",
"model": "gpt-4"
},
{
"id": "support",
"name": "Support Bot",
"model": {
"primary": "claude-opus",
"fallbacks": ["haiku"]
},
"subagents": {
"allow_agents": ["sales"]
}
}
]
},
"bindings": [
{
"agent_id": "support",
"match": {
"channel": "telegram",
"account_id": "*",
"peer": {"kind": "direct", "id": "user123"}
}
}
],
"session": {
"dm_scope": "per-peer",
"identity_links": {
"john": ["telegram:123", "discord:john#1234"]
}
}
}`
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(jsonData), cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal: %v", err)
}
if len(cfg.Agents.List) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("agents.list len = %d, want 2", len(cfg.Agents.List))
}
sales := cfg.Agents.List[0]
if sales.ID != "sales" || !sales.Default || sales.Name != "Sales Bot" {
t.Errorf("sales = %+v", sales)
}
if sales.Model == nil || sales.Model.Primary != "gpt-4" {
t.Errorf("sales.Model = %+v", sales.Model)
}
support := cfg.Agents.List[1]
if support.ID != "support" || support.Name != "Support Bot" {
t.Errorf("support = %+v", support)
}
if support.Model == nil || support.Model.Primary != "claude-opus" {
t.Errorf("support.Model = %+v", support.Model)
}
if len(support.Model.Fallbacks) != 1 || support.Model.Fallbacks[0] != "haiku" {
t.Errorf("support.Model.Fallbacks = %v", support.Model.Fallbacks)
}
if support.Subagents == nil || len(support.Subagents.AllowAgents) != 1 {
t.Errorf("support.Subagents = %+v", support.Subagents)
}
if len(cfg.Bindings) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("bindings len = %d, want 1", len(cfg.Bindings))
}
binding := cfg.Bindings[0]
if binding.AgentID != "support" || binding.Match.Channel != "telegram" {
t.Errorf("binding = %+v", binding)
}
if binding.Match.Peer == nil || binding.Match.Peer.Kind != "direct" || binding.Match.Peer.ID != "user123" {
t.Errorf("binding.Match.Peer = %+v", binding.Match.Peer)
}
if cfg.Session.DMScope != "per-peer" {
t.Errorf("Session.DMScope = %q", cfg.Session.DMScope)
}
if len(cfg.Session.IdentityLinks) != 1 {
t.Errorf("Session.IdentityLinks = %v", cfg.Session.IdentityLinks)
}
links := cfg.Session.IdentityLinks["john"]
if len(links) != 2 {
t.Errorf("john links = %v", links)
}
}
func TestConfig_BackwardCompat_NoAgentsList(t *testing.T) {
jsonData := `{
"agents": {
"defaults": {
"workspace": "~/.picoclaw/workspace",
"model": "glm-4.7",
"max_tokens": 8192,
"max_tool_iterations": 20
}
}
}`
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(jsonData), cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal: %v", err)
}
if len(cfg.Agents.List) != 0 {
t.Errorf("agents.list should be empty for backward compat, got %d", len(cfg.Agents.List))
}
if len(cfg.Bindings) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bindings should be empty, got %d", len(cfg.Bindings))
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_HeartbeatEnabled verifies heartbeat is enabled by default
func TestDefaultConfig_HeartbeatEnabled(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if !cfg.Heartbeat.Enabled {
t.Error("Heartbeat should be enabled by default")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_WorkspacePath verifies workspace path is correctly set
func TestDefaultConfig_WorkspacePath(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace == "" {
t.Error("Workspace should not be empty")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_Model verifies model is set
func TestDefaultConfig_Model(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Model != "" {
t.Error("Model should be empty")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_MaxTokens verifies max tokens has default value
func TestDefaultConfig_MaxTokens(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.MaxTokens == 0 {
t.Error("MaxTokens should not be zero")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_MaxToolIterations verifies max tool iterations has default value
func TestDefaultConfig_MaxToolIterations(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.MaxToolIterations == 0 {
t.Error("MaxToolIterations should not be zero")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_Temperature verifies temperature has default value
func TestDefaultConfig_Temperature(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Temperature != nil {
t.Error("Temperature should be nil when not provided")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_Gateway verifies gateway defaults
func TestDefaultConfig_Gateway(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Gateway.Host != "127.0.0.1" {
t.Error("Gateway host should have default value")
}
if cfg.Gateway.Port == 0 {
t.Error("Gateway port should have default value")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_Providers verifies provider structure
func TestDefaultConfig_Providers(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Providers.Anthropic.APIKey != "" {
t.Error("Anthropic API key should be empty by default")
}
if cfg.Providers.OpenAI.APIKey != "" {
t.Error("OpenAI API key should be empty by default")
}
if cfg.Providers.OpenRouter.APIKey != "" {
t.Error("OpenRouter API key should be empty by default")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_Channels verifies channels are disabled by default
func TestDefaultConfig_Channels(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Channels.Telegram.Enabled {
t.Error("Telegram should be disabled by default")
}
if cfg.Channels.Discord.Enabled {
t.Error("Discord should be disabled by default")
}
if cfg.Channels.Slack.Enabled {
t.Error("Slack should be disabled by default")
}
2026-03-07 17:44:24 +00:00
if cfg.Channels.Matrix.Enabled {
t.Error("Matrix should be disabled by default")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_WebTools verifies web tools config
func TestDefaultConfig_WebTools(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
// Verify web tools defaults
if cfg.Tools.Web.Brave.MaxResults != 5 {
t.Error("Expected Brave MaxResults 5, got ", cfg.Tools.Web.Brave.MaxResults)
}
if len(cfg.Tools.Web.Brave.APIKeys) != 0 {
t.Error("Brave API key should be empty by default")
}
if cfg.Tools.Web.DuckDuckGo.MaxResults != 5 {
t.Error("Expected DuckDuckGo MaxResults 5, got ", cfg.Tools.Web.DuckDuckGo.MaxResults)
}
}
func TestSaveConfig_FilePermissions(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("file permission bits are not enforced on Windows")
}
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.json")
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if err := SaveConfig(path, cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveConfig failed: %v", err)
}
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Stat failed: %v", err)
}
perm := info.Mode().Perm()
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if perm != 0o600 {
t.Errorf("config file has permission %04o, want 0600", perm)
}
}
func TestSaveConfig_IncludesEmptyLegacyModelField(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.json")
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if err := SaveConfig(path, cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveConfig failed: %v", err)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ReadFile failed: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(string(data), `"model_name": ""`) {
t.Fatalf("saved config should include empty legacy model_name field, got: %s", string(data))
}
}
// TestConfig_Complete verifies all config fields are set
func TestConfig_Complete(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace == "" {
t.Error("Workspace should not be empty")
}
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Model != "" {
t.Error("Model should be empty")
}
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Temperature != nil {
t.Error("Temperature should be nil when not provided")
}
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.MaxTokens == 0 {
t.Error("MaxTokens should not be zero")
}
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.MaxToolIterations == 0 {
t.Error("MaxToolIterations should not be zero")
}
if cfg.Gateway.Host != "127.0.0.1" {
t.Error("Gateway host should have default value")
}
if cfg.Gateway.Port == 0 {
t.Error("Gateway port should have default value")
}
if !cfg.Heartbeat.Enabled {
t.Error("Heartbeat should be enabled by default")
}
}
func TestDefaultConfig_OpenAIWebSearchEnabled(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if !cfg.Providers.OpenAI.WebSearch {
t.Fatal("DefaultConfig().Providers.OpenAI.WebSearch should be true")
}
}
func TestDefaultConfig_ExecAllowRemoteEnabled(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if !cfg.Tools.Exec.AllowRemote {
t.Fatal("DefaultConfig().Tools.Exec.AllowRemote should be true")
}
}
func TestLoadConfig_OpenAIWebSearchDefaultsTrueWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(`{"providers":{"openai":{"api_base":""}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WriteFile() error: %v", err)
}
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig() error: %v", err)
}
if !cfg.Providers.OpenAI.WebSearch {
t.Fatal("OpenAI codex web search should remain true when unset in config file")
}
}
func TestLoadConfig_ExecAllowRemoteDefaultsTrueWhenUnset(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(`{"tools":{"exec":{"enable_deny_patterns":true}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WriteFile() error: %v", err)
}
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig() error: %v", err)
}
if !cfg.Tools.Exec.AllowRemote {
t.Fatal("tools.exec.allow_remote should remain true when unset in config file")
}
}
func TestLoadConfig_OpenAIWebSearchCanBeDisabled(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(`{"providers":{"openai":{"web_search":false}}}`), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WriteFile() error: %v", err)
}
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig() error: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Providers.OpenAI.WebSearch {
t.Fatal("OpenAI codex web search should be false when disabled in config file")
}
}
func TestLoadConfig_WebToolsProxy(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.json")
configJSON := `{
"agents": {"defaults":{"workspace":"./workspace","model":"gpt4","max_tokens":8192,"max_tool_iterations":20}},
"model_list": [{"model_name":"gpt4","model":"openai/gpt-5.4","api_key":"x"}],
"tools": {"web":{"proxy":"http://127.0.0.1:7890"}}
}`
if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(configJSON), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("os.WriteFile() error: %v", err)
}
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig() error: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Tools.Web.Proxy != "http://127.0.0.1:7890" {
t.Fatalf("Tools.Web.Proxy = %q, want %q", cfg.Tools.Web.Proxy, "http://127.0.0.1:7890")
}
}
// TestDefaultConfig_DMScope verifies the default dm_scope value
// TestDefaultConfig_SummarizationThresholds verifies summarization defaults
func TestDefaultConfig_SummarizationThresholds(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.SummarizeMessageThreshold != 20 {
t.Errorf("SummarizeMessageThreshold = %d, want 20", cfg.Agents.Defaults.SummarizeMessageThreshold)
}
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.SummarizeTokenPercent != 75 {
t.Errorf("SummarizeTokenPercent = %d, want 75", cfg.Agents.Defaults.SummarizeTokenPercent)
}
}
func TestDefaultConfig_DMScope(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
if cfg.Session.DMScope != "per-channel-peer" {
t.Errorf("Session.DMScope = %q, want 'per-channel-peer'", cfg.Session.DMScope)
}
}
func TestDefaultConfig_WorkspacePath_Default(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_HOME", "")
feat(credential): part1 add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard ke… (#1521) * feat(credential): add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard keygen - pkg/credential: new package with AES-256-GCM enc:// credential format, HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (passphrase + optional SSH key binding), ErrPassphraseRequired / ErrDecryptionFailed sentinel errors, and PassphraseProvider hook for runtime passphrase injection - pkg/credential/store: lock-free SecureStore via atomic.Pointer[string]; passphrase never written to disk or os.Environ - pkg/credential/keygen: ed25519 SSH key generation helper used by onboard - pkg/config: replace os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar) with credential.PassphraseProvider() at all three call sites so that LoadConfig and SaveConfig use whatever passphrase source is active - cmd/picoclaw/onboard: prompt for passphrase with echo-off, generate picoclaw-specific SSH key, re-encrypt existing config on re-onboard - docs/credential_encryption.md: design doc for the enc:// format * fix(credential): address Copilot review comments on PR #1521 - credential.go: decouple ErrPassphraseRequired from env var name; message is now 'enc:// passphrase required' since PassphraseProvider may come from any source, not just os.Environ - credential.go: Resolver resolves symlinks via EvalSymlinks before the isWithinDir containment check, preventing symlink-based path traversal for file:// credential references - store.go: tighten comment to describe only what SecureStore guarantees (in-memory only); remove claims about how callers transport the value - store_test.go: replace the meaningless GetReturnsCopy test (Go strings are immutable, equality across two calls proves nothing) with TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet that exercises atomic.Pointer under 10-goroutine concurrent Set/Get load - config_test.go: update error-message assertion to match new sentinel text - docs/credential_encryption.md: remove reference to non-existent 'picoclaw encrypt' subcommand; describe the onboard flow instead * fix(config): encryptPlaintextAPIKeys: struct-based encryption, fail-fast, remove raw []byte * fix(credential): require SSH private key for encryption/decryption, remove passphrase-only mode * lint: fix credential keygen lint, fix test keygen * onboard: make encryption opt-in via --enc flag Encryption (passphrase prompt + SSH key generation) is now only triggered when the user passes --enc to 'picoclaw onboard'. Without the flag, onboard skips the credential-encryption setup and writes a plain config + workspace templates directly. - Add --enc BoolFlag in NewOnboardCommand() - Pass encrypt bool into onboard() - Guard passphrase prompt, SSH key generation, and related env-var setup behind the encrypt branch - Adjust 'Next steps' output so the passphrase reminder only appears when --enc was used
2026-03-16 06:06:32 +00:00
var fakeHome string
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
fakeHome = `C:\tmp\home`
t.Setenv("USERPROFILE", fakeHome)
} else {
fakeHome = "/tmp/home"
t.Setenv("HOME", fakeHome)
}
cfg := DefaultConfig()
feat(credential): part1 add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard ke… (#1521) * feat(credential): add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard keygen - pkg/credential: new package with AES-256-GCM enc:// credential format, HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (passphrase + optional SSH key binding), ErrPassphraseRequired / ErrDecryptionFailed sentinel errors, and PassphraseProvider hook for runtime passphrase injection - pkg/credential/store: lock-free SecureStore via atomic.Pointer[string]; passphrase never written to disk or os.Environ - pkg/credential/keygen: ed25519 SSH key generation helper used by onboard - pkg/config: replace os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar) with credential.PassphraseProvider() at all three call sites so that LoadConfig and SaveConfig use whatever passphrase source is active - cmd/picoclaw/onboard: prompt for passphrase with echo-off, generate picoclaw-specific SSH key, re-encrypt existing config on re-onboard - docs/credential_encryption.md: design doc for the enc:// format * fix(credential): address Copilot review comments on PR #1521 - credential.go: decouple ErrPassphraseRequired from env var name; message is now 'enc:// passphrase required' since PassphraseProvider may come from any source, not just os.Environ - credential.go: Resolver resolves symlinks via EvalSymlinks before the isWithinDir containment check, preventing symlink-based path traversal for file:// credential references - store.go: tighten comment to describe only what SecureStore guarantees (in-memory only); remove claims about how callers transport the value - store_test.go: replace the meaningless GetReturnsCopy test (Go strings are immutable, equality across two calls proves nothing) with TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet that exercises atomic.Pointer under 10-goroutine concurrent Set/Get load - config_test.go: update error-message assertion to match new sentinel text - docs/credential_encryption.md: remove reference to non-existent 'picoclaw encrypt' subcommand; describe the onboard flow instead * fix(config): encryptPlaintextAPIKeys: struct-based encryption, fail-fast, remove raw []byte * fix(credential): require SSH private key for encryption/decryption, remove passphrase-only mode * lint: fix credential keygen lint, fix test keygen * onboard: make encryption opt-in via --enc flag Encryption (passphrase prompt + SSH key generation) is now only triggered when the user passes --enc to 'picoclaw onboard'. Without the flag, onboard skips the credential-encryption setup and writes a plain config + workspace templates directly. - Add --enc BoolFlag in NewOnboardCommand() - Pass encrypt bool into onboard() - Guard passphrase prompt, SSH key generation, and related env-var setup behind the encrypt branch - Adjust 'Next steps' output so the passphrase reminder only appears when --enc was used
2026-03-16 06:06:32 +00:00
want := filepath.Join(fakeHome, ".picoclaw", "workspace")
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace != want {
t.Errorf("Default workspace path = %q, want %q", cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace, want)
}
}
func TestDefaultConfig_WorkspacePath_WithPicoclawHome(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_HOME", "/custom/picoclaw/home")
cfg := DefaultConfig()
feat(credential): part1 add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard ke… (#1521) * feat(credential): add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard keygen - pkg/credential: new package with AES-256-GCM enc:// credential format, HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (passphrase + optional SSH key binding), ErrPassphraseRequired / ErrDecryptionFailed sentinel errors, and PassphraseProvider hook for runtime passphrase injection - pkg/credential/store: lock-free SecureStore via atomic.Pointer[string]; passphrase never written to disk or os.Environ - pkg/credential/keygen: ed25519 SSH key generation helper used by onboard - pkg/config: replace os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar) with credential.PassphraseProvider() at all three call sites so that LoadConfig and SaveConfig use whatever passphrase source is active - cmd/picoclaw/onboard: prompt for passphrase with echo-off, generate picoclaw-specific SSH key, re-encrypt existing config on re-onboard - docs/credential_encryption.md: design doc for the enc:// format * fix(credential): address Copilot review comments on PR #1521 - credential.go: decouple ErrPassphraseRequired from env var name; message is now 'enc:// passphrase required' since PassphraseProvider may come from any source, not just os.Environ - credential.go: Resolver resolves symlinks via EvalSymlinks before the isWithinDir containment check, preventing symlink-based path traversal for file:// credential references - store.go: tighten comment to describe only what SecureStore guarantees (in-memory only); remove claims about how callers transport the value - store_test.go: replace the meaningless GetReturnsCopy test (Go strings are immutable, equality across two calls proves nothing) with TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet that exercises atomic.Pointer under 10-goroutine concurrent Set/Get load - config_test.go: update error-message assertion to match new sentinel text - docs/credential_encryption.md: remove reference to non-existent 'picoclaw encrypt' subcommand; describe the onboard flow instead * fix(config): encryptPlaintextAPIKeys: struct-based encryption, fail-fast, remove raw []byte * fix(credential): require SSH private key for encryption/decryption, remove passphrase-only mode * lint: fix credential keygen lint, fix test keygen * onboard: make encryption opt-in via --enc flag Encryption (passphrase prompt + SSH key generation) is now only triggered when the user passes --enc to 'picoclaw onboard'. Without the flag, onboard skips the credential-encryption setup and writes a plain config + workspace templates directly. - Add --enc BoolFlag in NewOnboardCommand() - Pass encrypt bool into onboard() - Guard passphrase prompt, SSH key generation, and related env-var setup behind the encrypt branch - Adjust 'Next steps' output so the passphrase reminder only appears when --enc was used
2026-03-16 06:06:32 +00:00
want := filepath.Join("/custom/picoclaw/home", "workspace")
if cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace != want {
t.Errorf("Workspace path with PICOCLAW_HOME = %q, want %q", cfg.Agents.Defaults.Workspace, want)
}
}
// TestFlexibleStringSlice_UnmarshalText tests UnmarshalText with various comma separators
func TestFlexibleStringSlice_UnmarshalText(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
expected []string
}{
{
name: "English commas only",
input: "123,456,789",
expected: []string{"123", "456", "789"},
},
{
name: "Chinese commas only",
input: "123456789",
expected: []string{"123", "456", "789"},
},
{
name: "Mixed English and Chinese commas",
input: "123,456789",
expected: []string{"123", "456", "789"},
},
{
name: "Single value",
input: "123",
expected: []string{"123"},
},
{
name: "Values with whitespace",
input: " 123 , 456 , 789 ",
expected: []string{"123", "456", "789"},
},
{
name: "Empty string",
input: "",
expected: nil,
},
{
name: "Only commas - English",
input: ",,",
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: "Only commas - Chinese",
input: "",
expected: []string{},
},
{
name: "Mixed commas with empty parts",
input: "123,,456789",
expected: []string{"123", "456", "789"},
},
{
name: "Complex mixed values",
input: "user1@example.comuser2@test.com, admin@domain.org",
expected: []string{"user1@example.com", "user2@test.com", "admin@domain.org"},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var f FlexibleStringSlice
err := f.UnmarshalText([]byte(tt.input))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UnmarshalText(%q) error = %v", tt.input, err)
}
if tt.expected == nil {
if f != nil {
t.Errorf("UnmarshalText(%q) = %v, want nil", tt.input, f)
}
return
}
if len(f) != len(tt.expected) {
t.Errorf("UnmarshalText(%q) length = %d, want %d", tt.input, len(f), len(tt.expected))
return
}
for i, v := range tt.expected {
if f[i] != v {
t.Errorf("UnmarshalText(%q)[%d] = %q, want %q", tt.input, i, f[i], v)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestFlexibleStringSlice_UnmarshalText_EmptySliceConsistency tests nil vs empty slice behavior
func TestFlexibleStringSlice_UnmarshalText_EmptySliceConsistency(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("Empty string returns nil", func(t *testing.T) {
var f FlexibleStringSlice
err := f.UnmarshalText([]byte(""))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UnmarshalText error = %v", err)
}
if f != nil {
t.Errorf("Empty string should return nil, got %v", f)
}
})
t.Run("Commas only returns empty slice", func(t *testing.T) {
var f FlexibleStringSlice
err := f.UnmarshalText([]byte(",,,"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("UnmarshalText error = %v", err)
}
if f == nil {
t.Error("Commas only should return empty slice, not nil")
}
if len(f) != 0 {
t.Errorf("Expected empty slice, got %v", f)
}
})
}
feat(credential): part1 add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard ke… (#1521) * feat(credential): add AES-GCM encryption, SecureStore, and onboard keygen - pkg/credential: new package with AES-256-GCM enc:// credential format, HKDF-SHA256 key derivation (passphrase + optional SSH key binding), ErrPassphraseRequired / ErrDecryptionFailed sentinel errors, and PassphraseProvider hook for runtime passphrase injection - pkg/credential/store: lock-free SecureStore via atomic.Pointer[string]; passphrase never written to disk or os.Environ - pkg/credential/keygen: ed25519 SSH key generation helper used by onboard - pkg/config: replace os.Getenv(PassphraseEnvVar) with credential.PassphraseProvider() at all three call sites so that LoadConfig and SaveConfig use whatever passphrase source is active - cmd/picoclaw/onboard: prompt for passphrase with echo-off, generate picoclaw-specific SSH key, re-encrypt existing config on re-onboard - docs/credential_encryption.md: design doc for the enc:// format * fix(credential): address Copilot review comments on PR #1521 - credential.go: decouple ErrPassphraseRequired from env var name; message is now 'enc:// passphrase required' since PassphraseProvider may come from any source, not just os.Environ - credential.go: Resolver resolves symlinks via EvalSymlinks before the isWithinDir containment check, preventing symlink-based path traversal for file:// credential references - store.go: tighten comment to describe only what SecureStore guarantees (in-memory only); remove claims about how callers transport the value - store_test.go: replace the meaningless GetReturnsCopy test (Go strings are immutable, equality across two calls proves nothing) with TestSecureStore_ConcurrentSetGet that exercises atomic.Pointer under 10-goroutine concurrent Set/Get load - config_test.go: update error-message assertion to match new sentinel text - docs/credential_encryption.md: remove reference to non-existent 'picoclaw encrypt' subcommand; describe the onboard flow instead * fix(config): encryptPlaintextAPIKeys: struct-based encryption, fail-fast, remove raw []byte * fix(credential): require SSH private key for encryption/decryption, remove passphrase-only mode * lint: fix credential keygen lint, fix test keygen * onboard: make encryption opt-in via --enc flag Encryption (passphrase prompt + SSH key generation) is now only triggered when the user passes --enc to 'picoclaw onboard'. Without the flag, onboard skips the credential-encryption setup and writes a plain config + workspace templates directly. - Add --enc BoolFlag in NewOnboardCommand() - Pass encrypt bool into onboard() - Guard passphrase prompt, SSH key generation, and related env-var setup behind the encrypt branch - Adjust 'Next steps' output so the passphrase reminder only appears when --enc was used
2026-03-16 06:06:32 +00:00
// TestLoadConfig_WarnsForPlaintextAPIKey verifies that LoadConfig resolves a plaintext
// api_key into memory but does NOT rewrite the config file. File writes are the sole
// responsibility of SaveConfig.
func TestLoadConfig_WarnsForPlaintextAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
const original = `{"model_list":[{"model_name":"test","model":"openai/gpt-4","api_key":"sk-plaintext"}]}`
if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(original), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
cfg, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
}
// In-memory value must be the resolved plaintext.
if cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey != "sk-plaintext" {
t.Errorf("in-memory api_key = %q, want %q", cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey, "sk-plaintext")
}
// The file on disk must remain unchanged — LoadConfig must not write anything.
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
if string(raw) != original {
t.Errorf("LoadConfig must not modify the config file; got:\n%s", string(raw))
}
}
// TestSaveConfig_EncryptsPlaintextAPIKey verifies that SaveConfig writes enc:// ciphertext
// to disk and that a subsequent LoadConfig decrypts it back to the original plaintext.
func TestSaveConfig_EncryptsPlaintextAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
mustSetupSSHKey(t)
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.ModelList = []ModelConfig{
{ModelName: "test", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-plaintext"},
}
if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveConfig: %v", err)
}
// Disk must contain enc://, not the raw key.
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
if !strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
t.Errorf("saved file should contain enc://, got:\n%s", string(raw))
}
if strings.Contains(string(raw), "sk-plaintext") {
t.Errorf("saved file must not contain the plaintext key")
}
// A fresh load must decrypt back to the original plaintext.
cfg2, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig after SaveConfig: %v", err)
}
if cfg2.ModelList[0].APIKey != "sk-plaintext" {
t.Errorf("loaded api_key = %q, want %q", cfg2.ModelList[0].APIKey, "sk-plaintext")
}
}
// TestLoadConfig_NoSealWithoutPassphrase verifies that api_key values are left
// unchanged when PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE is not set.
func TestLoadConfig_NoSealWithoutPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
data := `{"model_list":[{"model_name":"test","model":"openai/gpt-4","api_key":"sk-plaintext"}]}`
if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(data), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
if _, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
}
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
if strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
t.Error("config file must not be modified when no passphrase is set")
}
}
// TestLoadConfig_FileRefNotSealed verifies that file:// api_key references are not
// converted to enc:// values (they are resolved at runtime by the Resolver).
func TestLoadConfig_FileRefNotSealed(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
keyFile := filepath.Join(dir, "openai.key")
if err := os.WriteFile(keyFile, []byte("sk-from-file"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
data := `{"model_list":[{"model_name":"test","model":"openai/gpt-4","api_key":"file://openai.key"}]}`
if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, []byte(data), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_SSH_KEY_PATH", "")
if _, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
}
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
if !strings.Contains(string(raw), "file://openai.key") {
t.Error("file:// reference should be preserved unchanged in the config file")
}
if strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
t.Error("file:// reference must not be converted to enc://")
}
}
// TestSaveConfig_MixedKeys verifies that SaveConfig encrypts only plaintext api_keys
// and leaves already-encrypted (enc://) and file:// entries unchanged.
func TestSaveConfig_MixedKeys(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
mustSetupSSHKey(t)
// Pre-encrypt one key so we have a genuine enc:// value to put in the config.
if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, &Config{
ModelList: []ModelConfig{
{ModelName: "pre", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-already-plain"},
},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup SaveConfig: %v", err)
}
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
// Extract the enc:// value from the saved file.
var tmp struct {
ModelList []struct {
APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
} `json:"model_list"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tmp); err != nil || len(tmp.ModelList) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("setup: could not parse saved config: %v", err)
}
alreadyEncrypted := tmp.ModelList[0].APIKey
if !strings.HasPrefix(alreadyEncrypted, "enc://") {
t.Fatalf("setup: expected enc:// key, got %q", alreadyEncrypted)
}
// Build a config with three models:
// 1. plaintext → must be encrypted by SaveConfig
// 2. enc:// → must be left unchanged (already encrypted)
// 3. file:// → must be left unchanged (file reference)
keyFile := filepath.Join(dir, "api.key")
if err := os.WriteFile(keyFile, []byte("sk-from-file"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
cfg := &Config{
ModelList: []ModelConfig{
{ModelName: "plain", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-new-plaintext"},
{ModelName: "enc", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: alreadyEncrypted},
{ModelName: "file", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "file://api.key"},
},
}
if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveConfig: %v", err)
}
raw, _ = os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
s := string(raw)
// 1. Plaintext must be encrypted.
if strings.Contains(s, "sk-new-plaintext") {
t.Error("plaintext key must not appear in saved file")
}
// 2. The pre-existing enc:// value must still be present (byte-for-byte unchanged).
if !strings.Contains(s, alreadyEncrypted) {
t.Error("pre-existing enc:// entry must be preserved unchanged")
}
// 3. file:// must be preserved.
if !strings.Contains(s, "file://api.key") {
t.Error("file:// reference must be preserved unchanged")
}
// Now load and verify all three decrypt/resolve correctly.
cfg2, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig after SaveConfig: %v", err)
}
byName := make(map[string]string)
for _, m := range cfg2.ModelList {
byName[m.ModelName] = m.APIKey
}
if byName["plain"] != "sk-new-plaintext" {
t.Errorf("plain model api_key = %q, want %q", byName["plain"], "sk-new-plaintext")
}
if byName["enc"] != "sk-already-plain" {
t.Errorf("enc model api_key = %q, want %q", byName["enc"], "sk-already-plain")
}
if byName["file"] != "sk-from-file" {
t.Errorf("file model api_key = %q, want %q", byName["file"], "sk-from-file")
}
}
// TestLoadConfig_MixedKeys_NoPassphrase verifies that when PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE
// is not set, enc:// entries cause LoadConfig to return an error, while plaintext
// and file:// entries in the same config are not affected.
func TestLoadConfig_MixedKeys_NoPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
// First encrypt a key so we have a real enc:// value.
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "test-passphrase")
mustSetupSSHKey(t)
if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, &Config{
ModelList: []ModelConfig{
{ModelName: "m", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-secret"},
},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup SaveConfig: %v", err)
}
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
var tmp struct {
ModelList []struct {
APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
} `json:"model_list"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &tmp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup parse: %v", err)
}
encValue := tmp.ModelList[0].APIKey
// Write a mixed config: enc:// + plaintext + file://
keyFile := filepath.Join(dir, "api.key")
if err := os.WriteFile(keyFile, []byte("sk-from-file"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
mixed, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"model_list": []map[string]any{
{"model_name": "enc", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": encValue},
{"model_name": "plain", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": "sk-plain"},
{"model_name": "file", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": "file://api.key"},
},
})
if err := os.WriteFile(cfgPath, mixed, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup write: %v", err)
}
// Now clear the passphrase — LoadConfig must fail because enc:// cannot be decrypted.
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
_, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("LoadConfig should fail when enc:// key is present and no passphrase is set")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "passphrase required") {
t.Errorf("error should mention passphrase required, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestSaveConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider verifies that SaveConfig encrypts plaintext
// api_keys using credential.PassphraseProvider() rather than os.Getenv directly.
// This matters for the launcher, which clears the environment variable and redirects
// PassphraseProvider to an in-memory SecureStore.
func TestSaveConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
// Ensure the env var is empty — passphrase must come from PassphraseProvider only.
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
mustSetupSSHKey(t)
// Replace PassphraseProvider with an in-memory function (simulating SecureStore).
const testPassphrase = "provider-passphrase"
orig := credential.PassphraseProvider
credential.PassphraseProvider = func() string { return testPassphrase }
t.Cleanup(func() { credential.PassphraseProvider = orig })
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.ModelList = []ModelConfig{
{ModelName: "test", Model: "openai/gpt-4", APIKey: "sk-plaintext"},
}
if err := SaveConfig(cfgPath, cfg); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveConfig: %v", err)
}
raw, _ := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
if !strings.Contains(string(raw), "enc://") {
t.Errorf("SaveConfig should have encrypted plaintext key via PassphraseProvider; got:\n%s", raw)
}
}
// TestLoadConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider verifies that LoadConfig decrypts enc:// keys
// using credential.PassphraseProvider() rather than os.Getenv directly.
func TestLoadConfig_UsesPassphraseProvider(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cfgPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.json")
// Ensure the env var is empty throughout.
t.Setenv("PICOCLAW_KEY_PASSPHRASE", "")
mustSetupSSHKey(t)
const testPassphrase = "provider-passphrase"
const plainKey = "sk-secret"
// First, encrypt the key using the same passphrase.
encrypted, err := credential.Encrypt(testPassphrase, "", plainKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Encrypt: %v", err)
}
raw, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"model_list": []map[string]any{
{"model_name": "test", "model": "openai/gpt-4", "api_key": encrypted},
},
})
if err = os.WriteFile(cfgPath, raw, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup: %v", err)
}
// Redirect PassphraseProvider — env var is empty, so without this the load would fail.
orig := credential.PassphraseProvider
credential.PassphraseProvider = func() string { return testPassphrase }
t.Cleanup(func() { credential.PassphraseProvider = orig })
cfg, err := LoadConfig(cfgPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadConfig: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey != plainKey {
t.Errorf("api_key = %q, want %q", cfg.ModelList[0].APIKey, plainKey)
}
}